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Causal Structure of Moral Dilemmas Predicts Perceived Difficulty of Making a Decision
Barbara Kuhnert*, Felix Lindner, Martin Mose Bentzen, Marco Ragni
We introduce causal agency models as a modeling technique for representing and reasoning about ethical dilemmas. We
ﬁnd that ethical dilemmas, although they look similar on the surface, have very different causal structures. Based on
their structural properties, as identiﬁed by the causal agency models, we cluster a set of dilemmas in Type 1 and Type 2
dilemmas. We observe that for Type 2 dilemmas but not for Type 1 dilemmas, a utilitarian action Pareto dominates the
possibility of refraining from action. Based on the model, we hypothesize, that Type 2 dilemmas are perceived as less
difﬁcult than Type 1 dilemmas.
We conducted an experiment with 60 participants. Participants received well-known dilemma situations and had to rate
the difficulty of making a decision between each two dilemmas. Thereby the Runaway Trolley Dilemma and the Pregnancy
Dilemma represented the dilemma of Type 1, the Boat Dilemma represented a Type 2 dilemma [1].
The results of the participants’ rating of the difﬁculty supports the models’ predictions. As hypothesized, a forced decision
between the structurally similar dilemmas Pregnancy and Runaway Trolley leads to no signiﬁcant difference in the frequen-
cies of evaluations. Participants rated the decision difﬁculty of these two dilemmas equally. This can mainly be explained
by the dilemmas’ same complexity of the formal structure. However, the questions concerning the decision difﬁculties
between the ethical scenarios Pregnancy and Overweight Boat resp. Runaway Trolley and Overweight Boat resulted in re-
liable differences in the evaluation of the difﬁculty of the moral decision situation. In both cases, the Boat Dilemma was
selected reliably less often as the more difﬁcult decision situation. These results support our theory of a different formal
structure and therefore a lower complexity of the Boat Dilemma. Once the participants have opted for a moral dilemma,
their rating of the difﬁculty to ﬁnd a decision in this decision situation is statistically equal in comparison to the rating
of the participants who have chosen the other dilemma. The individual mean values show a tendency towards a lower
decision difﬁculty in the Boat Dilemma.
To conclude, for Type 1 dilemmas, ethical principles predict different sets of permissible actions, and hence there is a
conflict to resolve which is not present for Type 2 dilemmas. Not having such a severe conflict between the actions makes
moral problems that are perceived as less difficult.
[1] Kuhnert, B., Lindner, F., Bentzen, M. M., & Ragni, M. (2017). Perceived difficulty of moral dilemmas depends on their
causal structure: A formal model and preliminary results. In 39th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (CogSci
2017).
*corresponding author (email: kuhnertb@informatik.uni-freiburg.de)
Poster Sessions: Monday, Sep 3, 15:30-17:30 and Wednesday, Sep 5, 17:00-19:00
33
